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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Andrew Dallas Morgan appeals from the district court's order revoking his
probation and executing the sentence previously imposed upon his guilty plea to
grand theft. He also challenges the Idaho Supreme Court's order denying his
motion to augment the record with transcripts from previous probation violation
admission and disposition hearings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In February 2008, Andrew Morgan entered the rooms of two patients at
the Life Care Center of Boise where he was formerly employed. (6/11/08 PSI,
pp.2-3.)

Morgan falsely identified himself as a close family friend of both

patients.

(Id.)

Morgan removed, from the bodies of both patients, patches

containing a high-dose prescription pain-relieving narcotic, Fentanyl, which had
been affixed to the patients with a strong adhesive. (Id.)
Upon noticing that the patches were missing, the Life Care Center
conducted an internal investigation.

(ld.)

Several Life Care Center staff

members reported that Morgan had visited with two patients whose pain patches
were missing.

(ld.)

One of those patients reported that Morgan entered her

room on two separate occasions and told her that he needed to remove her
Fentanyl patch in order for her to avoid disease. (ld.) A patient sitter reported
observing Morgan leaning over another patient who had just yelled out in pain.
(Id.)
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The Life Care Center put out security alerts and flyers with Morgan's
photo and implemented new security procedures. (Id.) Morgan then returned to
the facility and entered another patient's room.

(Id.)

The Life Care Center

Executive Director confronted Morgan, who ran out of the building. (Id.) An Ada
County detective subsequently made contact with Morgan, who admitted taking
the pain patches from three Life Care Center patients to support his pain
medication addiction. (Id.)
The state charged Morgan with one count of burglary and three counts of
grand theft. (R., pp.38-39.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Morgan pled guilty to
one count of grand theft and the state dismissed the remaining charges.

(R.,

pp.54-59.) In July 2008, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven
years with two years fixed, ordered Morgan to serve 120 days in the Ada County
jail, and then suspended the balance of the sentence and placed Morgan on
probation for seven years. (Id.)
Approximately one year later, the state filed a report of probation violation
alleging that Morgan violated his probation by failing to complete required
treatment through the St. Alphonsus Addiction Recovery Program and Health
and Welfare, failing to inform his probation officer that he had been terminated
from his employment for failing to come to work, failing to inform his probation
officer that he had been prescribed narcotics for his migraine headaches, and
being charged with driving without a license and insurance.

(R., pp.72-80.)

Morgan admitted violating his probation, and the district court revoked probation
but retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.104-106.) At the conclusion of the period of
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retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Morgan back on probation.

(R.,

pp.109-113.)
Less than a year later, the state filed a second report of probation
violation, alleging that Morgan violated his probation by being removed from the
Easter Seals treatment program due to poor attendance and violations of his
behavior contract, failing to pay supervision fees and restitution, having contact
with another probationer, and using medications contrary to the manner
prescribed by his physician.

(R., pp.127-133.)

Morgan admitted violating his

probation, and the district court revoked probation and imposed his original
sentence. (R., pp.158-160.)
Morgan filed a notice of appeal timely as to the second probation violation
disposition order. (R., pp.155-157.) In his notice of appeal, Morgan requested
the preparation of the entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in I.A.R.
25(c), which, in this case, included transcripts from Morgan's entry of plea and
sentencing hearings. (ld.) He also requested transcripts of the admission and
disposition hearings associated with his second probation violation.

(ld.) The

clerk's appellate record and requested transcripts were filed on September 30,

2011. (9/30/11 Notice of Appeal Record Filed; see generally Tr.)
On November 29, 2011, after requesting and receiving one extension of
time to file his Appellant's brief (11/7/11 Order Granting Extension of Time),
Morgan filed a motion to suspend the briefing schedule and to augment the
appellate record with transcripts of the admission and disposition hearings
associated with his first probation violation (11/29/11 Motion to Augment and to
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Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof).

The state

filed an objection. (12/20/11 Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend
the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof.")

The Idaho Supreme

Court denied Morgan's motion without comment and reset the due date for the
filing of Morgan's Appellant's brief. (1112/12 Order Denying Motion to Augment
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.)
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ISSUES
Morgan states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Morgan due process
and equal protection when it denied his motion to augment
with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr.
Morgan's probation?

(Appellant's brief, pA.)
The state reph rases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Morgan failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record
with irrelevant transcripts?

2.

Has Morgan failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
by revoking his probation after his second probation violation?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Morgan Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record
With Irrelevant Transcripts
A.

Introduction
Morgan contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate

record with as-yet unprepared transcripts associated with his first probation
violation, the Idaho Supreme Court has violated his constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection and has effectively denied him effective assistance
of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-14.) Morgan has failed to establish
a violation of his constitutional rights, however, because he has failed to show
that the requested transcripts are even relevant to, much less necessary for
resolution of, the only issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712,720,23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

Morgan Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The
Requested Augmentations
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is

sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the
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proceedings below."

State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477

(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles,
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however,
"will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or
other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper,
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted)); Lane, 372
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12.
To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, the defendant must show
that any omissions from the record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal.
State v.

Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968)

(distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also
United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice
Morgan "must present something more than gross speculation that the
transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th
Cir. 2002). Morgan has failed to carry this burden.
Morgan's appeal is timely only from the district court's August 3, 2011
order revoking his probation and executing his sentence after his second
probation violation. (See R., pp.158-160 (order revoking probation filed August
3, 2011), pp.155-157 (notice of appeal filed August 2, 2011 ).) He has failed to
explain, much less demonstrate, how transcripts of hearings associated with his
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first probation violation are necessary to decide the only issues over which this
Court has jurisdiction on this appeal.

To the contrary, the record amply

demonstrates that Morgan's motion to augment was properly denied because he
failed to show that the transcripts he requested were necessary for adequate
review of the district courts' decisions to revoke Morgan's probation and order
execution of his sentences.
There is no evidence that the district court had such transcripts when it
revoked Morgan's probation in August 2011, or that it relied upon anything said
at the previous hearings as a basis for its decision to revoke Morgan's probation
and order his sentence executed.

Because the as-yet unprepared transcripts

were never presented to the district court in relation to the second probation
revocation proceedings, they were never part of the record before the district
court in considering whether to revoke Morgan's probation and are not properly
considered for the first time on appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376
n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a decision on the issues
raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review of the record made
below" and "will not consider new evidence that was never before the trial
court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App.
1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and
consider new evidence.").
The state recognizes the Court of Appeals' statement in State v.
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), relied on by Morgan
(Appellant's brief, p.11), that appellate "review [of] a sentence that is ordered into
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execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing when
the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation." There are, however, two reasons
why Hanington does not support Morgan's claim of entitlement to the requested
tra nscripts.
First, unlike Hanington, Morgan does not challenge the sentence that was
ordered into execution following his period of probation but argues only that the
district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation (see Appellant's brief,
pp.14-17), a decision that is capable of appellate review without resort to
information bearing on the reasonableness of the sentence that was ultimately
ordered into execution.
Second, and more importantly, Hanington does not stand for the
proposition that a merits-based review of a decision to revoke probation and
order a sentence executed requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate
record of transcripts of every hearing over which the trial court presided. To the
contrary, the law is well established that, absent a showing that evidence was
presented at prior hearings, and/or that the district court relied on such evidence
in reaching its decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to
transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted before the date
probation was finally revoked.

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194

(1971) (state is not "required to expend its funds unnecessarily" where "part or
all of the stenographic transcript ... will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal" (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496
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("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by
unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcripts does not mean that the
State must waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate
appellate review."); see also Strand, 137 !daho at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78
(indigent appellant challenging denial of Rule 35 motion not entitled to
transcription at public expense of Rule 35 hearing at which no evidence was
presented).
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review the revocation of
probation, Morgan has failed to show, or even attempt to show, that any such
circumstances apply here. Morgan has failed to point to anything in the record
that would indicate that statements made at hearings associated with his first
probation violation were considered or played any role in the court's decision in
August 2011 to revoke Morgan's probation and order execution of the sentence
after his second probation violation. As such, Morgan has failed to show that
such transcripts are necessary to complete an adequate record on this appeal.
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), Morgan claims that
he is only required to make a "colorable argument" that he needs "items" to
complete a record before the burden transfers to the state "to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's brief, p.i 0.) He
also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the constitutional
mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must provide him (and
all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record he desires unless the
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state proves that "some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or
frivolous."

(Appellant's brief, p.7; see also p.5 ("The only way a court can

constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript
is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.").)

No

reading of Mayer supports these legal arguments.
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct.

kL.

at 190. The appellate court denied his request for

a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government
expense only for felonies.

kL. at

191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was

entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim
transcript of his trial.

kL. at

193. The Court noted it addressed a similar issue in

Draper, 372 U.S. 487, where the Court held that the government need not
provide transcripts that were not '''germane to consideration of the appeal, and a
State will

not be required

circumstances. '"

to expend its funds

unnecessarily in such

Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 372 U.S. at 495-96).

However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record where that is necessary
to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be available to the
defendant with resources to pay his own way."

kL. at

195. "Moreover, where the

grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete
transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript
or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds."
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kL.

Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal.

lit at

194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate.

lit at 194-95.

See also

Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may
take notice of the importance of a transcript).
Here the proceeding challenged on appeal is the revocation of Morgan's
probation in August 2011. The record related to the district court's decision to
revoke Morgan's probation and order execution of his sentence is already
complete because all of the evidence considered by the district court is before
the appellate court. (See generally, 6/11/08 PSI, 7/5111 PSI, 7/18/11 APSI; R.,
pp.54-152; see generally Tr.)
It is Morgan's appellate burden to establish that the requested transcripts
are necessary to create an adequate appellate record to review the order
revoking his probation. The augmentations he sought, however, were of never
before prepared transcripts of hearings held months before the state filed its
second report of probation violation. Nothing in the record even suggests that
the requested transcripts (or anything contained therein) were before the district
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court in relation to the probation revocation proceedings. Because Morgan failed
to make a showing of germaneness and colorable need for the requested
transcripts, there is no burden on the state. Because all of the evidence before
the district court is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate
review, and Morgan has failed to establish a violation of his due process rights. 1
Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478.
Further, Morgan's argument that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his
due process rights lacks merit because Morgan was afforded the opportunity,
prior to the settling of the appellate record, to designate not only the standard
clerk's record, but also additional records necessary for inclusion in the clerk's
record on appeal. I.A.R 28(a) and (c).

In fact, Morgan took advantage of this

opportunity to request, and receive, transcripts of his admission and disposition
hearings associated with his second probation violation.

(R, pp.155-157; see

generally Tr.) Therefore, Morgan was provided the process by which he could
designate all documents in the record he believed were necessary for appeal.
While I.A.R 30 provides that a party may move the Idaho Supreme Court to add
to the settled clerk's record, nothing therein creates a right to such augmentation.
Morgan has failed to show that the ability to designate records for appellate
review under I.A.R 28 was insufficient to afford due process in his case.

As a component of his due process claim, Morgan argues that the denial of his
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
(Appellant's brief, pp.12-14.)
Because, for the reasons already explained, Morgan has failed to show that the
requested transcripts are necessary, or even relevant, for appellate review of the
district court's order revoking his probation, there is no possibility that the denial
of the motion to augment has deprived Morgan of effective assistance of counsel
on this appeal.
1

13

Morgan has also failed to establish that denial of his request to augment
the record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied him equal protection.
Morgan cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate
records because of their indigence. (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-12 (citing, SLQ.,.,
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the record
that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Morgan's request
for transcripts solely because he is indigent.

In fact, Morgan's motion would

have properly been denied even if he had the funds to pay for the transcripts.
The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation to set forth a
ground sufficient to jusJify the augmentation requested.

I.A.R. 30.

Morgan's

motion to augment was denied because he failed to meet this minimal burden,
imposed upon all parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or even
helpful in addressing appellate issues.

The Idaho Supreme Court's order

properly denied the motion to augment because Morgan failed to make a
showing that any appellant - indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to augment
the record as requested.

There is no reason to believe that the motion to

augment would have been granted had Morgan been paying for the requested
transcripts; the rule applies to all parties, not just the indigent.
Morgan has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was in
any way influenced or decided by his indigence, nor has he demonstrated that
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review
any issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. To the contrary, the
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record amply demonstrates that Morgan's motion to augment was properly
denied because he failed to show that the transcripts he requested were
necessary for adequate review of the district court's decision to revoke Morgan's
probation and order execution of his sentence. Because Morgan has failed to
show his due process and equal protection rights were implicated, much less
violated, by the denial of his motion to augment, he has failed to show any basis
for relief.

II.
Morgan Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Revoking His Probation After His Second Probation Violation
A.

Introduction
Morgan contends the district court abused its discretion in revoking his

probation, because, he claims, probation "was achieving its intended goal [of]
rehabilitating a drug addict," and because his struggles with probation were a
result of Morgan "attempting to balance his chronic pain with his addiction to
prescription medication."

(Appellant's brief, pp.14-17.) None of Morgan's

arguments establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district

court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion."
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105,233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (quoting State v.
Leach, 135 Idaho 525,529,20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)).
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C.

The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Revoking Morgan's
Probation
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v.
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324,325,834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams,
115 Idaho 1053,1054,772 P.2d 260,261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114
Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.

State v.

Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122
Idaho at 325,834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558,758 P.2d at 717.
At his second probation violation admission hearing, Morgan admitted to
failing to complete treatment through the Easter Seals rehabilitation program.
(Tr., p.48, L.7 - p.50, L.13.) Specifically, the presentence investigator reported:
Heidi Garrett, Easter Seals Case Manager, was contacted
via telephone. She reported that Mr. Morgan was difficult to treat
and was not compliant. She relayed that he missed groups "weeks
at a time" and claimed his absences were due to migraine
headaches. While he consistently claimed he had suffered a back
injury and also suffered migraine headaches, he never produced
records from a physician to verify his claim. Ms. Garrett shared that
Mr. Morgan was prescribed Norco 5 and told her that he took more
than his prescribed dose, because his prescribed dose was not
strong enough to address his pain. Ms. Garrett said Mr. Morgan
was referred to physicians who could address his pain issues;
however, he did not follow up with these referrals. She explained
that Mr. Morgan was provided with every service available and he
only had to stay clean, look for work, and participate in treatment in
order to be successful. Instead, he took his medications as he
wanted to, he attended groups when he wanted to, and he did not
follow through with referrals.
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(7/5/11 PSI, p.6; see also 7/5111 PSI attachments, "Case Management Client

Progress Notes. ") Morgan also admitted to having contact with another criminal
probationer in violation of his probation. (Tr., p.50, L.14

p.51, L.2.)

At the second probation violation disposition hearing, the district court
referenced Morgan's failure to take responsibility for his crime and history of not
fully participating in required treatment:
The PSI investigator said that she felt you didn't hold
yourself responsible. I think that's about right. I think you hold
everybody else responsible for a lot of the bad choices you are
making.
You don't follow through.
You don't make your
appointments. You make it impossible for probation to actually
work, and then you suggest that you should continue on probation
even though you don't do the most basic things of probation, which
is make your appointments and follow through with what you are
supposed to follow through with.
(Tr., p.62, Ls.13-25.)
The district court considered Morgan's recommendation that the court
retain jurisdiction for a second time so that Morgan could participate in the CAPP
rider program. (Tr., p.63, Ls.6-9.)

However, the court ultimately concluded that

the CAPP program was not "intensive enough for a person who is avoiding
facing facts as much as [Morgan is]." (Id.) Instead, because the district court felt
Morgan needed a "much longer term program," the court revoked probation,
ordered

the

original

sentence

executed,

and

recommended

the

IDOC

Therapeutic Community. (Tr., p.63, Ls.1-5.)
That Morgan believes the district court should have reinstated his
probation a second time does not establish an abuse of discretion. This is
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particularly true where, as here, Morgan was given two opportunities to
rehabilitate in the community, but continued to violate his probation.

Because

Morgan has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in revoking
his probation and ordering his sentence executed, he is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order revoking Morgan's probation
DATED this 20th day of April 2012

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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